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Increasingly, courts faced with the problems of providing efective remedies to com-
plex social problems are turning to specialized adjunct personnel for assistance. In the
article which follows, Professor Weinberg examines the expanding role of such "judi-
cial adjuncts. " She then goes on to propose the creation of a more coherent structure for
eftcint training and evaluation of these important judicial ojicers.
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In public law litigation,' individuals or identifiable groups challenge
governmental or institutional priorities. For the plaintiffs in such suits,
vindication of their claim in the court may be only the beginning. Un-"
less the obstacles to successful remedy formulation and implementation
are surmounted, they will not achieve their ultimate goal.
Courts are becoming more creative in designing and more assertive in
overseeing the implementation of remedies in public lawsuits. When a
remedy requires complex restructuring of governmental or quasi-gov-
ernmental institutions, a court often chooses a specific plan from a
broad range of possibilities, based on its assessment of the political, so-
cial, and legal consequences of each alternative.
2
* Assistant Professor, Law and Social Policy Program, Graduate School of Social Work
and Social Research, Bryn Mawr College; LL.M., Columbia University, 1980; J.D., Harvard
University, 1972.
1. The term "public law litigation" is drawn from Abram Chayes' landmark article, The
Role of tht Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Chayes- I] expanded upon in his recent article, Forward- Public Law Litigation and the Burger
Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Chayes-2]. As used here, the term
"public law" is broader than civil rights or institutional reform, although this article deals
primarily with those issues. I would expand the definition of public law to include all com-
plex litigation where a broadly characterized public interest, that is one which extends be-
yond the particular interests of the parties, is at stake. This definition would include
antitrust, securities, and other commercial litigation where the remedy involves, at least in
part, a consideration of public interest. It would also include disputes about administrative
agency intervention or regulation. Owen Fiss has termed public law remedies which involve
institutional or policy restructuring "structural reform." See, e.g., 0. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS
INJUNCTION (1978); Fiss, Forward The Forms ofjustice, 93 -ARv. L. REV. 1 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Fiss, Forward]. See also Conard, Afasrojustice: A Syst matic Approach to Con&ct Resolution,
5 GA. L. REV. 415 (1971).
2. See generall, K. PARKER, MODERN JUDICIAL REMEDIES (1975); Note, Implementation
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Courts immersed in public law litigation often turn for assistance to a
new form of court-appointed officer, a "judicial adjunct."'3 Judicial ad-
juncts perform roles and functions which range from the traditional
ones of "master" or "receiver" to complex roles within panels or com-
mittees with broad responsibility for formulating and implementing
remedies.
4
The use of judicial adjuncts has profoundly affected court procedure
and the structure of litigation. This paper examines the role of judicial
adjuncts and their impact on the judicial system. First, it explores the
antecedents of the present-day public law judicial adjunct. It then ex-
amines the various roles adjuncts play and the conflicts which arise
when they fill multiple roles. It proceeds to analyze the ways the organi-
zational structure within which adjuncts operate limits their effective-
ness. Finally, it advocates the establishment of an administrative
adjunct agency, as one way both to resolve problems of role conflict and
to enhance adjunct effectiveness.
Problems in Institutional Reform Litigation, 91 HARV. L. REV. 428 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Implementation Problems]; Special Project: The Remedial Process in Institutional Reform Litiga-
tion, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 784 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Special Project]; 0. Fiss, THE CIVIL
RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978). Because of the fluid nature of the disputes and issues which
emerge at the remedial stage, the character of the class action has changed. Traditional class
actions are sometimes inadequate to meet the demands of these disputes. See Chayes-1 and
Chayes-2, supra note 1, and D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977). For
additional suggestions, see J. VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY (1976).
3. Throughout this paper, the term "judicial adjunct" denotes individuals appointed to
assume some of the functions of ajudge during the remedial phase. These individuals include
the master or special master, receiver, magistrate, review panel, human rights committee, and
ombudsman. Several generic terms have been coined: "neoreceivers" (Comment, Equitable
Remedies: An Analysis ofJudiwal Utilization of Noreceverships to Implement Large-Sale Institutional
Change, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 1161 [hereinafter cited as Comment, Aeoreceiverships]); "masters"
(Nathan, The Use of Masters in Institutional Reform Litigation, 10 U. TOL. L. REV. 419 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Nathan, Masters]); "administrators" (Special Project, supra note 2);
"monitors" (Note, Monitors: A New Equitable Remedy, 70 YALE L. 103 (1960) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Monitors]). Each term has a definition connoting particular duties. At the risk
of adding another term to the vast nomenclature, I use the term "judicial adjunct" as a
descriptive classification to emphasize more accurately the multiple roles and the relationship
with the court.
4. In many cases the judicial adjunct has taken on significant attributes of an administra-
tive agency: the Office of the Special Master in Halderman v. Pennhurst, 446 F. Supp. 1295
(E.D. Pa. 1977), aj'd inpart, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), reo'd as to the federal Developmen-
tally Disabled Act, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), and the Willowbrook Review Panel in N.Y. State Ass'n
of Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); see also N.Y.
State Ass'n of Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); 409 F.
Supp. 606 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); 438 F. Supp. 440 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); 456 F. Supp. 85 (E.D.N.Y.
1978), aftd, 596 F.2d 27 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 836 (1979); 466-F. Supp. 479 (E.D.N.Y.
1978); 466 F. Supp. 487 (E.D.N.Y.), affd, 612 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1979); 492 F. Supp. 1099
(E.D.N.Y. 1980); 492 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D.N.Y.), reo'd, 631 F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 1980); 544 F.
Supp. 330 (E.D.N.Y.), aj'd, 661 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1981); 557 F. Supp. 1165 (E.D.N.Y. 1982),
are examples of such structures. The separation of guilt-determination and sentence-imposi-
tion in the criminal process also provides a useful analogy. Se, e.g., Coffee, Emerging Legal
Issues in the Indimdualization of/just&t, 73 MICH. L. REV. 1361 (1975).
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I. A Htstor'cal Perspective
A. Private Law Counterparts
The "public law" judicial adjunct is not the direct outgrowth of any
single private law institution. Rather, it is related to several traditional
roles-master, receiver, and magistrate. The earliest "private law" judi-
cial adjuncts in English law were the masters, or "clerks," appointed by
the equity Chancellor to select the proper writ for parties seeking relief
from the Chancellor. 5 Later, in the United States and England, masters
and receivers, single-function officers, were appointed by courts of eq-
uity to implement their decrees in "exceptional cases."
'6
Early judicial adjuncts were generally limited to a single role, often
performed prior to any verdict or decree. Masters served as factfinders
and hearing examiners, and were often experts in accounting and valua-
tion of damage claims. 7 Receivers served as administrators, guarding
assets, administering or liquidating property, and, later, taking a direct
role in reorganization of corporate enterprises. 8
Magistrates, by contrast, assumed quasi-adjudicatory functions in
both civil and criminal cases. Even today, magistrates act as hearing.
examiners for certain evidentiary hearings in federal and some state civil
courts, and may conduct certain civil trials with the consent of all
parties.9
B. Distinguishing Features of the Public Law Judcial Adjunct
The master, receiver, or magistrate is generally a one-dimensional ad-
junct, appointed before a decree for a limited task. The public law ad-
junct is more commonly appointed post-decree, with an open-ended
mandate that may require fact-finding, administrative activity, or quasi-
adjudicative behavior.' 0 The public law adjunct's role thus expands to
5. See, e.g., Bryant, The Ojice of Master in Chancey Early English Development, 40 A.B.AJ.
498, 499-501 (1954).
6. See Silberman, Masters and Magistrates, Part 1, The English Model, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1070 (1975), and Silberman, Masters and Magistrates, Part II, The Amercan Analogue, 50 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1297 (1975).
7. Note, Masters and Magistrates in the Federal Courts, 88 HARv. L. REV. 779 (1975).
8. See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REM EDIES (1973). The early cases presage
a jurisprudence of judicial adjuncts which was not developed by current appellate courts.
Courts weighed the intrusiveness of the remedy against the scope of the right being vindi-
cated. See Special Project, supra note 2, and Goldstein, A Swann Songfor Remedies: Equitable
Relief/n the Burger Court, 13 HARv. C.R.-C. L. L. REV. 1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Goldstein,
Swann Song].
9. 28 U.S.C. § 636 (1976).
10. Owen Fiss has documented the emergence of a post-decree stage of litigation in 0.
Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNcTION (1978), and Fiss, Fonoard, supra note 1. See also Morgan
v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216 (D. Mass. 1975), afd, 530 F.2d 401 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426
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fill the unmet needs of the remedial process. The role may involve use of
traditional powers and sanctions, such as contempt,1 1 but also includes
new functions.
The context within which the public law adjunct functions differs sig-
nificantly from that of the adjunct's private law counterparts. First, the
remedial process may involve a series of incremental disputes, all of
which must be resolved before a remedy is complete, but many of which
are not evident until after a decision on substantive issues has been
reached. 12 Thus, one role of the public law adjunct may be to expedite
the resolution of disputes without continual judicial intervention by set-
ting up ongoing mediation or problem-solving forums. In Wyatt v.
Stckney 13 this assistance took the form of monitoring by citizens' Human
Rights Committees, implemented three years after the original decree.
In Morgan v. Kerrzgan 14 a receiver was appointed several years after the
decree.
Second, judicial adjuncts work in a setting where the range of possible
remedies that might vindicate a particular right is wide. Selection of the
specific remedy from the various alternatives is a major function of the
adjunct. 15
U.S. 935 (1976) (panel of experts to hold hearings and make remedial recommendations);
Hamilton v. Landrieu, 351 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. La. 1972); Halderman v. Pennhurst, 446 F.
Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977), ajfd hpart, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd as to federal Devel-
opmentally Disabled Act, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
11. Courts of equity have routinely used contempt powers to implement decrees. How-
ever, contempt, while useful as an enforcement tool, can do little to facilitate implementation,
particularly in the political sphere. In N.Y. State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey,
492 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 631 F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 1980), the trial court's power to
issue contempt citations extended only to the named defendants-the Governor, Lieutenant
Governor, and other state officials.
12. For example, in Halderman v. Pennhurst, 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977),aftdin
part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), reo'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), the disputants did not argue over
whether conditions at Pennhurst State School and Hospital needed improvement--that was
generally conceded by both parties (although the propriety of court intervention was not
conceded). Following the decree, however, increasingly complex disputes emerged, in which
subgroups of plaintiffs sometimes intervened on the side of the defendants. These disputes
related to the nature and scope of the remedy and, most specifically, to whether the institu-
tion should be closed as the trial court ordered. See Bradley et al., "Longitudinal Study of the
Court-Ordered Deinstitutionalization of Pennhurst, Historical Overview I" (Unpublished
Document, HHS Contract No. 130-79-3, April 7, 1980).
13. 344 F. Supp. 373, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part, remanded in part sub
nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
14. Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass. 1974), af'd sub nom. Morgan v.
Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975). See also Morgan v. Kerri-
gan, 409 F. Supp. 1141 (D. Mass. 1975), afdsub nom. Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527
(1st Cir. 1976), cert. denid, 429 U.S. 1042 (1977).
15. See Fiss, Forward, supra note 1, at 56. Appellate courts have been more inclined to
approve a remedy-creating adjunct where defendants have failed to formulate a remedy
themselves. See the Boston School Desegregation Case, a series of district and circuit court
decisions culminating in Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1042 (1977); Newman v. Alabama, 466 F. Supp. 628 (M.D. Ala. 1979); Halderman v.
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Third, the process of formulating and effectuating public law reme-
dies raises questions not present in private law settings because the goal
of public law remedies is to change a social or political structure and to
affect behavior. 16 Determination of the remedy often involves use of
non-traditional kinds of evidence, such as studies of psychological, so-
cial, or demographic conditions. Choices among remedies involve pol-
icy considerations that are essentially non-judicial in nature.
Hart v. Community School Board17 provides an apt example. In Hart, the
court found defacto segregation in Coney Island schools. Judge Wein-
stein wished to devise a remedy which would integrate the schools with-
out destroying the community. He chose to do so by appointing an
"outside" expert to first study alternatives, then creating an outline for a
desegregation plan, and finally forging community consensus for such a
plan. The expert was chosen not so much for experience in desegrega-
tion cases as for his ability to marshall evidence relating to housing and
neighborhood planning. 18
Fourth, the remedial process in public law cases places special empha-
sis on non-adjudicatory dispute resolution techniques such as mediation
and negotiation. Many of the parties involved in such litigation (partic-
ularly defendants) are accustomed to operating in a political sphere in
which negotiation is central. In many cases, the parties have a relation-
ship that will outlast the litigation: for instance, administrator and cli-
ent, patient, or community. Thus, when the parties participate in
implementation of the remedy, the relationship may continue with a
minimum of disruption. Reports of adjuncts' activities rate negotiation
high on the list of desired adjunct functions. 19
Pennhurst. 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977), affdt 'part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd,
451 U.S. 1 (1981).
16. See D. HOROWITz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977) at 45, 48-49, 274-284.
These issues, and others having to do with the political and administrative difficulties of court
involvement, are detailed in Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 949, 967, 975-976 (1978); Frug, The Judical Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 715
(1978). Professor Mishkin argues that a focus onfonm of remedy rather than on substantive
right should cause courts to step back from imposing remedies which encroach on state or
local prerogatives. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Connor v. Johnson, 256 F.
Supp. 962 (S.D. Mass. 1966). See also Comment, The Casefor Dirina Court Management of the
Reapportionment Process, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 504 (1966).
17. 383 F. Supp. 699 (E.D.N.Y.), suppkmented, 383 F. Supp. 769 (E.D.N.Y.), appeal dis-
missed, 497 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974), afd, 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975).
18. Berger, The Odyssey ofa Special Master, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 707 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Berger, Odyssey].
19. Colin Diver points out the importance of negotiation as part of "power-broking" in
Diver, TheJudge as Politcal Power-Broker, 65 VA. L. REv. 43 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Diver].
In Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children (PARC) v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257
(E.D. Pa. 1972), the trial judge played an active role in mediating post-decree disputes among
and between parties and non-parties, to the point of holding monthly open hearings where
grievances could be aired. In Massachusetts, District Judge Tauro took an active mediative
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Finally, because a remedy, as a continuous process, repeatedly affects
the substantive conflicts which gave rise to the litigation, it is often diffi-
cult to separate issues relating to implementation of the remedy from
those surrounding consideration of the merits of the dispute. At times
courts appear to consider the feasibility of a remedy even when deter-
mining liability, particularly where the right asserted is a threshold or
novel one.20 Thus, a court may find that no right exists where a novel or
unworkable remedy would be required.
2 1
II. The Role of the Adjunct
The public law adjunct is a hybrid, not easily defined by terms such
as master or receiver. Whether one looks at the tasks courts order ad-
juncts to perform or at what judicial adjuncts in fact do, it is clear that
judicial adjuncts perform several functional roles. These roles are re-
viewed below. In any particular case, one or more of these roles may
form part of a judicial adjunct's mandate.
1. Investigative
Factfinding traditionally is ministerial, not involving the actual gath-
ering of evidence. The prototypical master acts solely as a factfinder,
hearing evidence, then making findings and recommendations to the
judge. In contrast, the public law factfinding adjunct is frequently an
active investigator, asked to ascertain what evidence is needed, then dis-
cover and obtain it.22
role in several contemporaneous mental health treatment cases, literally demanding that the
parties settle the case and devise a remedy, in some instances long before the trial. Boston
Globe, July 31, 1977, at 2, col. 2. This role, of course, places a premium on case settlement.
20. See J. VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY (1979). In Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), for
instance, the Supreme Court based its condemnation of the district courts decision on a cate-
gorical rejection of the standing of the parties and of the existence of a case or controversy,
seeing remedy as inseparable from liability. Ironically, the Court's action came a few weeks
after the parties had reached a negotiated settlement as to remedy. See also Lawrence Tribe's
discussion of the structural justice model in L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw
(1977), at 1143-1144.
21. See J. VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY (1979). See alro Hinkle, Appellate Supenrion of Remedies
in Public Law Adjudication, 4 FLA. ST. L. REV. 411 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Hinkle, Appellate
Superozsionl. Plaintiff "burn-out" is not uncommon during a drawnout remedial process in
which substantive issues continually mingle-with the implementation remedies, sending the
parties repeatedly back to court. Since the administrative system can outlive (and outspend)
the less organized plaintiffs, the defendants- in such cases may eventually prevail. See
Lottman, Paper Victories and Hard Realities, in PAPER VICTORIES AND HARD REALITIES (Brad-
ley, ed. 1976).
22. The evidence gathering function is not unique to public law adjudication. In the
private sector, judicial adjuncts have also been used to gather evidence, particularly when the
adjunct's expertise is needed to assemble and interpret such evidence.
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Legal evidence is of two types--interpretive and causal.2 3 Judicial
adjuncts may need to gather and evaluate both types. Interpretive evi-
dence, whether it is scientific, forensic, testimonial or "legislative," is an
observation about an object or a state of being.2 4 Causal evidence is
evidence which asserts a causal connection between independent phe-
nomena, such as empirical or statistical studies of alternative remedies
and their effect in a particular case.2 5 Judicial adjuncts may use inter-
pretive evidence-even of a "social science" character-to provide a ra-
tionale for choosing a particular remedy. For example, evidence that
magnet schools do not cause people to move away from a neighborhood,
or that community living arrangements are better for the retarded than
large institutions, calls for interpretive rather than causal judgments.2 6
However, much of the evidence adjuncts accumulate is causal, because
it is used as proof of the fact or facts asserted (for instance, that busing
will achieve integration).
Hart v. Community School Board provides an example of causal factfind-
ing by a public law adjunct. The court believed that housing patterns
were at the root of the school desegregation issue, and that any remedy
had to take into account the potential impact on housing. To achieve
this goal, Judge Weinstein appointed as master Curtis Berger, a profes-
sor at Columbia Law School who specializes in housing. Professor Ber-
ger sought out broad segments of the community, including white and
black parents without school-age children, federal and state housing offi-
cials, political officials, and private foundations such as the Ford Foun-
dation.2 7 As Professor Berger perceived his role:
23. Dworkin, Social Change and Constitutional Rihts-The Dilemma of Uncertainty, 6 J. OF
LAw AND ED. 3 (1977).
24. Id. at 3, 4.
25. The quality of evidence in public law disputes is often criticized as "inferior" social
fact or legislative evidence, inappropriate for ordinary rules of evidence or forms of proof.
Much of the evidence thought to be proof of the discrimination in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 349 U.S. 294 (1955), has been criticized for this reason. Much of
the criticism has been addressed to "soclat science" evidence used as proof of liability during
pre-decree stages of litigation. However, the criticism--that somehow this evidence is less
reliable-applies to evidence used to determine remedy as well. See, e.g., Horowitz, supra note
2. Courts have often expressed frustration with the "game playing" attitude that often char-
acterized such evidentiary interpretations, with social scientists squaring off against one an-
other. See Judge Skelly Wright's lament in Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C.
1967) cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1968). See Doyle, Can Social Science Data Be Used in Decision-
making? 6J. OF LAw AND ED. 13, 17-18 (1977), citing J. Coleman, Recent Trends in School
Education, paper presented to American Educational Research Ass'n (April 2, 1975).
26. Dworkin suggests that it is not the evidence, but the nght determined that is novel and
unconventional in public law cases. This, he suggests, happens when a court finds that a
particular kind of segregation violates a fundamental constitutional right. Thus the famous
footnote 11 evidence in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954), 349 U.S.
294 (1955) showing the harmful effect of segregation on black children, is not necessary for
liability, though it is of course relevant in deciding upon a remedy.
27. Berger, Odssey, supra note 18 at 711, 719, /21, 726-727.
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* . . I was looking for more than evidence. I had to learn all that I could
about community attitudes, about the readiness of school and other gov-
ernment officials to move collaboratively toward a remedy, and about the
obstacles that might confront a remedy plan. . . . I viewed myself. . . not
as a surrogate judge, but as a bridge from the court to the community that
ultimately would have to obey the remedial order.
2 8
Hart illustrates why courts turn to judicial adjuncts to gather and
evaluate both interpretive and causal evidence. An adjunct who assesses
the need for and gathers evidence, then evaluates the balance and valid-
ity of such evidence facilitates the development and implementation of a
remedy which is both practical and consistent with the trial court's in-
terpretive judgments.
2. Remedial: Formulation and Implementation
The role most often associated with judicial adjuncts is remedy plan-
ning and implementation. 29 In cases where a detailed remedial decree
has been formulated by the judge or the parties, adjuncts perform the
ministerial tasks of organization and administration. Acting as neutral
policy analysts, with full access to information and an understanding of
conditions surrounding the dispute, adjuncts can bridge the parties' par-
tisan perspectives and the judge's necessarily legal orientation.
But in other cases, where the adjunct is given broad discretion by a
general decree, the adjunct may be both architect and engineer, formu-
lating and implementing the remedy. Where this is the situation, the
adjunct may formulate or suggest alternative remedies to the judge and
the parties, resolve collateral disputes which arise during implementa-
tion, or present a completed (and sometimes an implemented) remedy
to the court. The interpretive remedial role requires management skills
and substantive expertise. The adjunct must have an ability to translate
legal mandates into clear directives for administrators and an ability to
determine and marshall the evidence necessary to facilitate the creation
of appropriate remedies.3 0 The adjunct's role thus goes beyond fact-
28. Berger, Odss, supra note 18 at 711-12.
29. See, e.g., Diver, supra note 19; Fiss, Forward, supra note 1; Tribe, Structural Due Process,
10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269 (1975). Contrast with Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reform-
ers, npra note 16, and Glazer, ShouldJudges Administer Social Services?, 50 PuB. INTEREST 64
(1978).
30. See Special Project, supra note 2, at 809-12. See also the suggested method for courts
issuing decrees in Goldstein, Swan Song, supra note 8, at 65-68, and the futile, pre-adjunct
attempts to have the parties formulate a plan in many of the institutional reform cases al-
ready discussed. Cf, Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972),
affd in part, remanded infpart sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Morgan
v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216 (D. Mass. 1975), afd, 530 F.2d 401 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 935 (1976). Judge Frank Johnson has done considerable work gathering and inter-
preting evidence, and views this as part of the judge's role in such cases. See Johnson, Observa-
tion.: The Constitution and the Federal DistrictJudge, 54 TEx. L. REv. 903 (1976). See also Morgan
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finding and evidence-gathering to incorporate new functions, notably
planning, negotiation, and dispute resolution.
3'
The potential usefulness of adjuncts in this area is clear. Formulating
and implementing a remedy removes judges from adjudication. Imple-
mentation of remedies demands a deep immersion into daily details of
institutional behavior, understanding of social planning techniques, and
requires coordination of adversary, class, and judicial demands.
Often the remedial role is too broad for a single individual. A single
adjunct may need to rely on the goodwill of the parties and third par-
ties, as well as force of personality, and may find it difficult both to
formulate a workable remedy and perform the dispute resolution tasks
that the remedial process requires. Thus, courts may appoint commit-
tees or panels consisting of experts, class representatives, and representa-




Court mandates to judicial adjuncts often include administrative
tasks. As noted above, judicial adjuncts may assume some administra-
tive responsibilities when formulating and implementing remedies. In
some cases, however, the administrative role may become primary.
Public law judicial adjuncts can become temporary co-administrators of
v. Kerrigan, 409 F. Supp. 1141 (D. Mass. 1975); Rhem v. Malcolm, 377 F. Supp. 995
(S.D.N.Y.), afd in part, remanded in part, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974). See generally Special
Project, supra note 2, at 823-25.
31. Hart v. Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699 (E.D.N.Y.), supplemented, 383 F.
Supp. 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), afd, 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975); Moore v. Leflore County Bd. of
Election Comm., 361 F. Supp. 603 (N.D. Miss. 1972); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Chil-
dren (PARC) v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa.
1972). See Harris, The Title VIIAdministrator. A Case Study in Judial Flexibility, 60 CORNELL L.
REV. 53, 72-3 (1974). See also Chicago Housing Auth. v. Austin, 511 F.2d 87 (7th Cir. 1975);
Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 384 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Ill. 1974). See Halderman v.
Pennhurst, 446 F.2d 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1975); afd in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 451
U.S. 1 (1981). See generally Kaufman,Masters in the Federal Courts: Rule 53, 58 COLUM. L. REV.
452 (1958); Note, Masters and Magistrates in the Federal Courts, supra note 7; Note, Monitors, supra
note 3, at 103. Fiss has characterized the modem judicial adjunct as a new procedural insti-
tution, the most vivid expression of the dilemma of public law structural reform remedies,
because "he can be used as an intermediate structure, standing... between the judge and
the [defendant] organization and also between the judge and the body politic." Fiss, Forward,
supra note 1, at 56.
32. In Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216 (D. Mass. 1975), afd, 530 F.2d 401 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976). See also Morgan v. Kerrigan, 409 F. Supp. 1141 (D.
Mass. 1975), the Boston school desegregation case, in which the court appointed a coalition of
educators from area colleges, along with school administrators, community activists, and
others, to assist with developing a remedy. The Office of the Special Master, created by the
court in Halderman v. Pennhurst, 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977),afdin part, 612 F.2d 84
(3d Cir. 1979), revld, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), to implement the terms of the court's decree, was a
large organization, consisting of the Special Master and the Individual Hearing Master, com-
munity mental retardation service planners, parent coordinators, and support staff.
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the defendant agency or institution. The existing administrator may re-
main in place, while the judicial adjunct stands in the position of
"shadow" administrator. In one early public law case an adjunct Spe-
cial Review Committee was established by the trial court to supervise
the Department of Labor in its job of regulating state employment agen-
cies. 3 3 The adjunct is most likely to assume an administrative role
where it is difficult to differentiate purely remedial tasks from opera-
tional administrative tasks. For example, adjuncts appointed in school
desegregation cases are often responsible for setting school district
boundaries and for regulating assignment of pupils and teachers. 34
Receivers in public law suits are simply adjuncts performing adminis-
trative roles. The receivers appointed in Newman v. Alabama adminis-
tered Alabama state prisons; 35 those in Wyatt v. Ireland administered
Alabama state institutions for the mentally disabled, 36 taking over those
responsibilities from state employee administrators. In Morgan v. Kerr-
gan, the receiver assumed the responsibilities of both the Boston School
Committee and the South Boston High School's headmaster.
3 7
4. Monitoring
The public law adjunct was first used as a compliance monitor in
employment discrimination cases. 38 Remedies in these cases often in-
volve the implementation of a long-term and complex plan for hiring
and promoting affected minorities. Courts often appoint a "watchdog"
monitor to oversee a defendant company or agency to ensure compli-
33. NAACP v. Brennan, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 9634 (D.D.C. 1974). The NAACP
had alleged race and national origin discrimination on the part of state employment bureaus
under the jurisdiction of the Labor Department. See Altman, Implementing A Civil Rights In-
junction: NAACP v. Brennan, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 739 (1978).
34. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 401, 430 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976);
Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 801 (1968). Thus,
the court-appointed Special Master in Halderman v. Pennhurst, 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa.
1977), af'd in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3dlCir. 1979), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), was directed by the
court to supervise the State Department of Welfare in its day-to-day responsibilities of ad-
ministering the agency. The procedure for placing Pennhurst residents in community facili-
ties was delegated by the court to another master, a Hearing Master. In elaborating his view
of the majority's action in Halderman v. Pennhurst, Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan
and Marshall, made clear his distrust of aggressive court intervention in state administrative
affairs: "In any event, however, the court should have not assumed the task of managing
Pennhurst or to decide in' the first instance which patients should stay and which should
remain. . .[quoting from Parham v. J.P., 442 U.S. 584 (1979)] 'The mode and procedure of
medical diagnostic procedures is not the business of judges,' " 451 U.S. 15, 37, 54 (1981).
Ironically, the case is once again before the Supreme Court, this time to consider state statu-
tory issues.
35. 466 F. Supp. 628 (M.D. Ala. 1979).
36. 515 F. Supp. 888 (M.D. Ala. 1981).
37. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216 (D. Mass. 1975), aj'd, 530 F.2d 401 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976). See Roberts, The Extent of Federal Judicial Equitable Power:
Receivership of South Boston High School, 12 NEW ENG. 55, 69 (1976).
38. See Harris, Title VII Administrator, supra note 31, at 58-62.
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ance, and to provide the technical information and ongoing compliance
measurement necessary to evaluate the remedial process. 39 This role has
few counterparts in private law, where monitoring is left to the parties,
and the court intervenes only when disputes arise. 4
When an institution is structurally altered by a court decree, the
changes reach deep into the administrative operation and must continue
even after the court has withdrawn if they are to be effective. Courts
become easily, and justifiably, frustrated with having to engage in me-
ticulous review of details. Yet experience has shown that such surveil-
lance is necessary, particularly where the effectiveness of a remedy
cannot be measured for some time.4 1 A judicial adjunct, in the role of




In the role of conflict mediator or ombudsman, the judicial adjunct is
a non-adjudicative resolver of disputes. As a mediator, the adjunct may
address conflicts which arise while a remedy is under consideration post-
decree, 43 may be concerned with disputes arising during the implemen-
tation phase, 44 or may act as an ongoing ombudsman or mediator to
resolve conflict between an institution and the clients it serves.
Resolution of disputes by non-adjudicatory means, such as negotia-
tion or mediation, is critical to the success of some remedies.
45 It is im-
portant that disputes which do not raise legal or constitutional issues be
resolved quickly without continuous court involvement.
39. See Hamilton v. Landrieu, 351 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. La. 1972); Gates v. Collier, 349 F.
Supp. 881, 900-901 (N.D. Miss. 1972); Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 898-99 (M.D. Fla.
1975), aft'd in part, modifwd in part, and remanded, 563 F.2d 741, 752-54 (5th Cir. 1977).
40. See M. HARRIS AND D. SPILLER, AFTER DECISION: IMPLEMENTATION OF JUDICIAL
DECREES IN CORRECTIONAL SETrINGS (1977). Seegenerally Eisenberg and Yeazell, The Ordi-
nag and the Extraordinay in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARv. L. REV. 465 (1980).
41. See the decree in Halderman v. Pennhurst, 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977), afdin
part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981). See also discussion in Bradley, supra
note 12 at 11-12. Such delays are not necessarily due to a defendant's intransigence. Rather,
they may occur because agencies and institutions are not static bodies. For example, a decree
directing an institution housing the mentally retarded to meet detailed standards and condi-
tions for resident treatment and habilitation may not provide the desired results until the
institution's facilities--staff and equipment-are capable of complying permanently with the
standards. See Special Project, supra note 2, at 828-29. See also NAACP v. Brennan, 8 Empl.
Prac. Dec. (CCH) 9634 (D.D.C. 1974); Wuori v. Zitnay, No. 75-80-SD (D. Me. June 2,
1980) (findings of special master).
42. See Special Project, supra note 2, at 828-29. See also NAACP v. Brennan, 8 Empl.
Prac. Dec. (CCH) 9634 (D.D.C. 1974).
43. See Hamilton v. Landrieu, 351 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. La. 1972).
44. See Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 841 (M.D. Fla. 1975),aj'dinpart, 563 F.2d 741
(5th Cir. 1977).
45. Curtis Berger's discussion of his experience as master in Hart bears this out. See gener-
ally Berger, Odyssey, supra note 18.
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Some problems presented to courts arise because the institution or
agency has inadequate procedures for resolving internal disputes involv-
ing institutional or agency clients (inmates, patients, clients, students).
46
In such situations, a court may require that an adjunct-mediator be in-
corporated into the permanent institutional structure, as part of an
ongoing dispute resolution process.
4 7
Even when the mediative role is not mandated by the terms of a de-
cree, or where the mediator is not incorporated into the institution, an
adjunct may informally assume the role of mediator, simply because the
adjunct is viewed by the parties as a central figure.48 As information-
gatherer and evaluator, the adjunct is in a position to respond to multi-
ple interests. When interest groups emerge (as the adversarial positions
of the adjudicatory stage splinter, and sub-classes or interests appear)
they may gravitate toward the adjunct.49 Often, as one commentator
has noted, adjuncts supervise "disputes which require . . .continuous
mediating, bargaining, and negotiation-in other words, the bulk of the
disputes (in any public law case]." 50
III. The Structure of the Remedial Process
Increasingly, courts and commentators express a need to re-examine
and redefine the limits of the trial court power in the appointment and
management of judicial adjuncts.5' The judicial adjunct-whether a
master, review panel, or receiver-is a microcosm of the public law re-
46. See, e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst, 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977),aJ'dnpart, 612
F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
47. See Knight v. Bd. of Education, 48 F.R.D. 115 (E.D.N.Y. 1969). See also Lesnick,
Gnevance Procedures in Federal Prsons, 123 PA. L. REV. 1 (1975).
48. An analog is the conflict resolution role played by some administrative agencies.
Agencies resolve conflicts about their own interpretive decisions, such as challenges to FTC
rulings. They also resolve conflicts between competing interests, such as challenges to FCC
licenses or disputes between consumers and industry over environmental protection regula-
tions or trade regulation policies. Often this role, by statute or regulation, is a quasi-adjudica-
tive one, with an appeals process culminating in the federal courts. See Richardson v. Perales,
402 U.S. 389 (1971). See generally Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1683-84, 1721-22 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Stewart, Reformation]. See
also L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION (1965); Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
49. For example, during the course of the remedial planning and effectuation stages in
the Pennhurst litigation, and while the case was on appeal to the Third Circuit, one group of
parents filed separate motions with both district and appellate courts, disagreeing with the
remedy being implemented and advocated by the "majority" plaintiffs. Philadelphia In-
quirer, June 29, 1979, at B-6.
50. See Note, Implementation Problems, supra note 2, at 446-47. See also Diver, The Judge as
Political Pawnbroker, supra note 19, for a sensitive portrayal of the bargaining and negotiation
"game" that often colors the remedial process.
51. See generally Chayes-2, supra note 1; Ssympoium.'Judially Managed Institutional Reform, 32
ALA. L. REv. (1981). See also Mishkin, supra note 16.
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medial process. Any proposal to make the remedial process more suc-
cessful should therefore begin with the judicial adjunct.
Judicial adjuncts face specific constraints because of the ad hoc, arbi-
trary nature of their present role. This section examines several of those
constraints: first, the ill-defined mandate of the adjunct; second, the in-
herent conflict when adjuncts play multiple roles within the remedial
process; third, the lack of defined standards for appellate review of judi-
cial adjunct performance; and fourth, the need for adjunct expertise in a
wide variety of fields.
1. The Judicial Adjunct's Mandate
The judicial adjunct makes no determination of legal rights, but
rather is engaged in a supervisory activity. The adjunct's role is played,
however, in the context of litigation, and the adjunct's actions are classi-
fied as trial court activities. The adjunct is viewed, by court and oppos-
ing sides alike, as a party to the remedial process, at times separate and
distinct from the judge.
Given this new orientation, it is not hard to see why both trial and
review courts have struggled with defining the legitimate scope of the
adjunct's role.52 If the adjunct is an extension of the trial court, the
adjunct's actions must be reviewed by appellate courts in that context.
However, because the adjunct has a separate and somewhat independ-
ent identity, and because many of the adjunct's activities take place
outside the judicial arena, the trial court's actual control is limited.
There are no guidelines delimiting the behavior and authority of judi-
cial adjuncts. To put the issue simply, much of the lack of clarity in the
role of the judicial adjunct stems from the fact that the adjunct is a
bureaucrat functioning within a judicial or "rights" model.
Most public law disputes have emerged within the "rights" model
framework of protection of fundamental individual or group rights
against encroachment by state or private policies. The judicial or
"rights" model 53 emphasizes the paramount importance of individual
rights within institutions; the adversary style of dispute resolution; and
the hierarchy of appellate court review. Proposed remedies generally
52. The district court's decree in Halderman v. Pennhurst, 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa.
1977), aft'd tn pari, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), while comprehensive
and extensive, still does little more than give a general outline to the master's job. The first
opinion of the Third Circuit in Pnnhurst, 612 F.2d at 111-16, in its discussion of the role of the
master, struggled to reach for more than a delineation of duties.
53. The "rights" model is a composite developed from the writings of H.L.A. Hart, Ron-
ald Dworkin, and others. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 184-205 (1977).
The administrative or bureaucratic model is best described by J. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND
LEGITIMAcY 4-5, 15-20 (1978) and Stewart, Reformation, supra note 48, at 1671-76.
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also follow this model. 54 However, remedies are administered in a bu-
reaucratic context-an organizational scheme which treats individuals
as recipients of a privilege or service offered through the skill and knowl-
edge of the institutional provider.
55
It has been suggested that by expanding the definition of the rights of
recipients of services, the "rights" model correspondingly reduces the
powers and responsibilities of the administrators of services. Indeed,
Nathan Glazer has argued that "one undoubted influence of an increase
in [recipient] rights is a reduction of power and discretion of working
administrators, and a simultaneous shifting of power and discretion
from below to further up the chain of command. '56 Thus, when courts
appoint judicial adjuncts, existing administrative power and discretion
are threatened, not only by the court itself, but also by the "substitute"
bureaucracy the court creates.
Public law remedies should be designed and implemented in a man-
ner which recognizes the tension between bureaucratic behavior and in-
dividual rights. A satisfactory system would employ the most
appropriate features of the judicial model, so that individual rights
would be recognized and vindicated, but would implement these rights
in a manner consistent with principles of bureaucratic management.
This would eliminate both the polarization created by adversary pro-
cess, and the stark reliance on authority demanded by a bureaucratic
model.
2. Confkcting Roles ofJudial Adjuncts
As judicial adjuncts assume increased responsibility for administering
public law remedies, and become a more permanent institution within
the judicial system, concerns arise which go beyond mere managerial
complexities.
The court's mandate to the judicial adjunct often requires the adjunct
to perform several different types of functions within the same time
frame and context---evidence-gathering, remedy design and evaluation,
day-to-day administration of the institution, and follow-up monitoring
of the remedy. These tasks are not easily performed by one person with-
out conflict. For instance, a factfinding adjunct who first designs, then
implements a remedy may have a stake in the initial design and may
tend to ignore later-discovered information that should prompt a
54. See J. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 1-42 (1978) for a
discussion of the law reform model of social change.
55. See Perlmutter, The Executive Bind Constraints Upon Leadtrship, in LEADERSHIP IN So-
ciAL ADMINISTRATION (Perlmutter and Slavin, eds. 1980).
56. Glazer, supra note 29, at 77.
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change in design. In the hands of a more impartial adjunct the remedy
might be adjusted to adapt to changing factual patterns.
Changes in the issues central to the remedial process may necessitate
reevaluation of remedial priorities.5 7 An adjunct who formulates and
implements a remedy may not be effective in the role of neutral monitor
if there is perceived or actual bias in favor of the adjunct's own design.
Similarly, a neutral monitor may be unable to act as a mediator without
becoming partisan.
Monitoring and mediative tasks may pose problems for adjuncts. If a
judicial adjunct is responsible for planning or implementing a remedy,
he or she may not be able to resolve disputes over implementation im-
partially. Adjuncts who have performed the remedial role may ally
themselves with one or more of the parties, particularly if one party
(usually plaintiffs) is pressing for compliance, and the other (usually de-
fendants) is resisting compliance. When that happens, it may be diffi-
cult for an adjunct to also assume a neutral, monitoring role.
Finally, the skills required to function as an administrator in a polit-
ical arena are in many ways antithetical to the other possible roles of an
adjunct. It is difficult for adjuncts who hold temporary administrative
positions to engage in the political and practical bargaining that accom-
panies administrative roles in agencies or institutions. The adjunct does
not necessarily have credibility with superiors in the bureaucracy. The
temporary nature of the adjunct's role here may make difficult long-
term planning involving state legislative and bureaucratic institutions.5
The experience of the Office of the Special Master (O.S.M.) in Hader-
man v. Pennhurst illustrates the problems of conflicting roles. The O.S.M.
had to monitor and implement the decree, enforce it against defendants'
57. The chronology of many structural reform cases is filled with repeated modifications
initiated by judge, parties, or adjunct. See the lengthy history and series of citations in Wyatt
v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), af'din part sub nom. Wyatt v.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216 (D. Mass.
1975), af'd, 530 F.2d 401 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976). See also Donald
Horowitz' discussion of Hobson v. Hansen and North-City Area-Wide Council v. Romne in D.
Horowitz, supra note 2, at 106-70, 68-105. See also Harris, Title VIIAdminirsrator, supra note 31.
For a discussion of the discrete techniques of adjudication and neutral monitoring, see Diver,
supra note 19, at 96. See also Anderson v. Redman, 429 F. Supp. 1105 (D. Del. 1977).
58. See Owen Fiss' discussion of legislative failure and footnote 4 of United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 652 n.4 (1938), in Fiss, Fonoard, supra note 1, at 6-9. See
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). See also the discussion by the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court in Perez v. Boston Housing Auth., 400 N.E.2d 1231, 1252-53 (Mass. 1980). But
set Eisenburg and Yeazell, supra note 40, at 494-506. One may question the court's authority
to take on agency administrative roles, then delegate them to an adjunct. Delegation of ad-
ministrative responsibility is justified on grounds that state or federal (legislative or executive)
corrective means have failed. Such delegation is fraught with both conceptual and practical
problems, however. Doctrines of federalism and separation of powers call into question the
constitutionality of such delegations, at least in some instances.
Yale Law & Policy Review
non-compliance, and work constructively with the defendants to meet its
terms. Thus,
[tihe unique position occupied by the Office of the Special Master results
in numerous ironies and political contradictions. For instance, [the Special
Master's] major role as a policeman in the system is in conflict with its
program development responsibilities . . . In addition to being enforcers,
however, staff. . . must also function as intermediaries and facilitators
• . . Further, many observers in Pennsylvania see [the Special Master] as
merely an arm of the plaintiff's counsel . . . The expectation that [the
Master] should be a value-neutral entity represents a misunderstanding of
the circumstances that brought about its creation. Since the plaintiffs won
the case, they had the major influence on the judge with regard to the
structure of the remedy.
59
These problems highlight the need for clarity when defining an ad-
junct's role. If it is not clear whether an adjunct should be neutral, or
whether appointment of an adjunct after a decree presupposes an orien-
tation in favor of successful plaintiffs, the adjunct has few guidelines.
Particular behavior may be approved or disapproved depending on
which view prevails.
It is unlikely that the same adjunct can adequately perform all the
roles discussed above. Yet these and other conflicts rarely receive scru-
tiny because many of the day-to-day activities of adjuncts are insulated
from review. Only egregious behavior, and formal activities-written
reports and other communications such as hearings-are reviewed.
3. Judictal Adjuncts and Judicial Revz'w
Judicial review by appellate courts remains a desirable check on the
evolutionary process of court-interpreted law. However, appellate court
response to utilization of judicial adjuncts has been episodic.60 Trial
courts have little guidance as to how and when adjuncts should be uti-
lized.6 1 For the most part, appellate courts have limited their comments
59. Bradley, supra note 12, at 65-66.
60. See Robert Hinkle's discussion of the review process, comparing review of the adequacy
of a remedy with review of the appropnateness of a remedy, in Hinkle, Appellate Supervision, supra
note 21, at 418. Hinkle concludes that although appellate courts have not appeared to
change their standard for reviewing public law cases involving structural reform, they have
done so by exercising more stringent control over specific remedies. The fault, he points out,
is that only ad ho supervision without clearly-defined standards exists. Id at 425.
61. See the discussion of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Perez v. Boston
Housing Auth., 400 N.E.2d 1231, 1248-9 (Mass. 1980). Seealso Nathan, Masters, supra note 3;
Note, Receivership as a Remedy in Civil Rights Cases, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 115 (1969); Note,
Master Intervention in Prisons, 88 YALE L.J. 1062 (1979); Note, supra note 7; Note, Rirzo v. Goode..
Federal Remedies for Polie Misconduct, 62 VA. L. REV. 1259 (1976); Roberts, supra note 37;
Note, The Wyall Case: Implementation of a Judiial Decree Ordering Intitutional Change, 84 YALE
LJ. 1398 (1975); Berger, Odyssey, supra note 18, M. HARRIS AND D. SPILLER, AFrER DEcI-
SION: IMPLEMENTATION OF JUDIcIAL DECREES IN CORRECTIONAL SETrINGs; Fishman, The
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to whether trial courts have abused their discretion to create remedies or
whether trial court actions intrude too deeply into areas of state
administration .
62
The judicial adjunct's position in relation to appellate procedure is
likewise unclear. Courts sometimes use judicial adjuncts to perform
semi-autonomous non-adjudicatory functions in the remedial process.
However, the more adjuncts perform such functions, the more substan-
tial the alteration in the structure of litigation. This is true in part be-
cause the trial judge may not exercise complete control over the
behavior of a judicial adjunct.
An appellate court cannot easily determine when or whether a judi-
cial adjunct has overreached the mandate if the limits of an adjunct's
mandate are not clear. However, the legitimacy of adjunct appoint-
ment or activities can be ensured in several ways. Appellate courts can
attempt to define the limits of trial court discretion to appoint and dele-
gate tasks to adjuncts. This is the manner by which official administra-
tive behavior is commonly reviewed. 6 3 However, defining discretion
may not assure the appropriateness of adjunct activity in public law cases,
since behavior is measured against an absolute standard of judicial legit-
imacy. Where an adjunct assumes local government functions, appel-.
late courts may need to inquire into how deeply a judicial adjunct's
activities intrude into the activity of state officials. An otherwise appro-
priate remedy might usurp the administrative prerogatives of a state
agency,64 inhibit functions belonging to other state interests,65 or go be-
yond issues in litigation.66
Not all incursions into state or local affairs constitute abuses of discre-
tion. Wyatt v. Stickney6 7 and Newman v. Alabama68 were both Alabama
Limits of Remedial Powerl Hart v. Community School Board, in LIMITS OF JUSTICE (H. Kalodner
and J. Fishman, eds. 1978).
62. E.g., Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977) cert. granted in part andremanded
sub nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978) (prisons) and
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (mental institutions), disapproving the
open-ended Human Rights Committees appointed to "supervise" the institutions.
63. Professor Stewart has categorized the emerging role of administrative law as an "in-
terest representation" model. Elaboration of that model in the context of defining the ad-
junct's role in the remedial process is a partial aim of this proposal. See Stewart, Reformation,
supra note 48, at 1813. The administrative law model is particularly helpful in exploring the
parameters of judicial-and adjunct--discretion in the remedial process, and for viewing the
adjunct's role in policymaking (rulemaking), in part, as representative of a public interest. See
also Gellhorn, Pub/ic Participation in Adininstrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359 (1972).
64. Eg., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
65. Eg., Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
66. Eg., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
67. 344 F. Supp. 373, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), afd in part, remanded in part sub
nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
68. 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972), afd in part, 503 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975).
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cases: Wyatt involved a constitutional attack on the state's institutions
for the retarded; Newman involved conditions in the prisons. The district
court's remedial decree in each case mandated creation of a permanent
Human Rights Committee. The Committees were to be composed of
outside experts in the respective fields (institutions for the mentally dis-
abled in Wyatt, and correctional institutions in Newman). 69 Both cases
were decided by the same district court judge, Frank Johnson, then of
the Middle District of Alabama. In both cases the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit rejected the Committees as intrusive in scope (beyond
the scope of the original controversy) and in time (both Committees
were continuing bodies whose role would continue after the court's juris-
diction had ceased). 70 Yet, in those same cases, the Fifth Circuit upheld
other remedial measures appointing adjuncts to formulate and imple-
ment other remedies affecting the day-to-day operation of the institu-
tions. 71 Thus, in both cases, it was the permanence of the intrusion
rather than the intrusion itself that seemed to concern the appellate
court.
Another barrier to appellate review is the fact that many cases do not
culminate in a final trial and judgment, but in a consent decree. 72 As a
rule, consent decrees are not appealed; if they are, the appeal comes
after one party's failure to carry out a provision of the decree.
The consent decree issue raises serious concerns because of the multi-
ple interests involved in public law issues. Even if the immediate parties
decide to settle and to institute remedial procedures through a consent
decree, outside interests and "splinter" class interests should not be ex-
cluded from remedial planning and implementation. For this reason,
consent decrees in such cases ideally should be supervised closely by the
court, and subject to careful scrutiny on appellate review. If outside and
dissenting quasi-party interests are not protected, the result is often mul-
tiple or sequential lawsuits. 73 This presents an ironic dilemma: while
consent settlements conserve judicial energy, they may also turn a pub-
lic dispute into a private settlement, leaving public interests unmet.
69. 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. granted in part and
remanded sub nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978).
70. Id
71. 503 F.2d at 1314-15; 559 F.2d at 290.
72. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). See also N.Y. State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey,
393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Rhem v. Malcolm, 377 F. Supp. 995 (S.D.N.Y.),afdipart
and remanded in part, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974).
73. See Bronson v. Bd. of Educ., 525 F.2d 344 (6th Cir. 1975); cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934
(1976). This issue is currently the subject of considerable controversy in the private class
action area where evidentiary hearings on settlement are required. See, e.g., Note, Collateral
Attack on the Binding Efect of Class Action Judgments, 87 HARv. L. REV. 589 (1974). See Note,
Implementation Problems, supra note 2; Comment, Community Resistance to School Desegregation. En-
joining the Undefinable Class, 44 U. CHIC. L. REv. 111 (1976).
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Perhaps the most telling statement of appellate concern about the in-
consistent mandate and activities ofjudicial adjuncts comes from Justice
White's dissent in the Supreme Court's first opinion in Haderman v.
Pennhurst. Justice White expressed grave concern over the level of inter-
ference which court appointment of adjuncts potentially could bring to
state bureaucratic and institutional activities:
More properly, the court should have announced what it thought was nec-
essary to comply with the Act and then permitted an appropriate period
for the State to decide whether it preferred to give up federal funds and go
its own route. If it did not, it should propose a plan for achieving compli-
ance, in which event, if it satisfied the court, a decree incorporating the
plan could be entered and if the plan was unsatisfactory, the further use of
federal funds could be enjoined. In any event, however, the court should
not have assumed the task of managing Pennhurst or deciding in the first
instance which patients should remain and which should be removed ...
Congress eschewed creating any specific guidelines on the proper level of
institutionalization, leaving the question to the States to determine in the
first instance. A court-appointed Special Master is inconsistent with this
approach.
4
4. Inconsistent Levels of Skill, Expertise, and Access to Data
Disparities among court mandates and inconsistencies of appellate re-
view highlight the varied levels of skill and expertise of judicial adjuncts.
In the implementation phase and the remedial process a lawyer or judge
may have too narrow a perspective on issues of administrative or man-
agement policy, because the legal questions seem paramount. Yet an
adjunct who has previously played a role in administration or poli-
cymaking may fail to understand why the legal process appears to ig-
nore what to him or her seem to be necessities of the bureaucratic
process.
In the absence of any standardization of qualifications for appoint-
ment of judicial adjuncts, courts have used a variety of criteria. Some
courts have appointed as adjunct a lawyer with prior experience in the
substantive area of the dispute.7 5 Others have looked to a person with a
particular expertise useful to the resolution of the underlying dispute.
7 6
74. Halderman v. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. 1, 54-55 (1981) (White, J. dissenting).
75. Vincent Nathan, a law professor with expertise in criminal law, was master in the
prison cases, Taylor v. Perini, 413 F. Supp. 189, 198 (N.D. Ohio J976) and Jones v. Witten-
berg, 440 F. Supp. 60, 66 (N.D. Ohio 1977). Michael Lottman, an expert in mental health
law, was a member of Willowbrook Review Panel in N.Y. State Ass'n for Retarded Children,
Inc. v. Carey, 596 F.2d 27, 32 (2d Cir. 1976), a fg 409 F. Supp. 606-(E.D.N.Y.), and Special
Hearing Master in Halderman v. Pennhurst, 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977), afdin par,
612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
76. Judge Weinstein appointed Curtis Berger, a law professor and expert in property law
and housing, as master in a school desegregation case, because he was concerned about the
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Courts have also selected adjuncts who have been employees, adminis-
trators, or evaluators of the agency involved or a similar agency, or who
have served in the public sector in that or a related field. 77 Often, an
existing administrator is chosen as adjunct for his or her administrative
expertise.78 Increasingly, courts have tried to combine essential qualities
by appointing a committee to serve as adjunct. This has the advantage
of broadening the scope and depth of the adjunct's resources and
perspectives.
79
Faced with a need for policymaking in the formulation of a remedy,
most trial courts have used adjuncts as a last resort. Courts tend first to
request that the parties propose and implement a remedy, or even to
request that the legislature enact specific reforms. However, such suc-
cessive references have a limited effect; they lack the comprehensive per-
spective which delegation to an adjunct with ongoing oversight
responsibilities can provide.
IV. An Admihstrative Adjunct Agency
A. The Need for an Independent Remedial Agency
The remedial process in public law disputes is essentially nonadjudi-
catory, requiring skills that do not depend upon an adversarial posture.
Negotiation and mediation play central roles in this process, and the
pa.:tisan orientation that characterizes the pre-decree stages of litigation
can easily defeat the objectives of twre remedial phase.
Many of the features which make the adversary process uniquely ef-
fective at championing rights and duties in substantive decisions are
counterproductive ','hcn applied to remedies, particularly those reme-
dies which raise issues of policy or politics rather than law. Because the
adversary process focuses on extremes, as presented by advocates with
desegrega-;on and housing patterns. Hart v. Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699
(E.D.N.Y.),suppiemented, 383 F. Supp. 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aft'd, 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975).
77. Carla Morgan, who served as Acting Special Master in the remedial phases of Halder-
man v. Pennkurst until that office was disbanded in December of 1982, had served in the MH-
MR office of one of the defendant counties in the litigation, and worked in the mental health
law unit of a public interest law firm representing some of the plaintiffs in the case, before
assuming the adjunct function.
78. In Newman v. Alabama, 466 F. Supp. 628, 636 (M.D. Ala. 1979), Judge Johnson
appointed the governor as receiver. The district superintendent of schools was appointed
receiver in Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975), and
the state superintendent in Turner v. Goolsby, 255 F. Supp. 724, 730 (S.D. Ga. 1966).
79. E.g., N.Y. State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 409 F. Supp. 606 (E.D.N.Y.
1976) (Willowbrook Review Panel); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 331 (M.D. Ala. 1976),
rev'd, 559 F.2d 283, 290 (5th Cir. 1977), cerl. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978); Wyatt v. Stickney,
344 F. Supp. 373, 378, 398 (M.D. Ala. 1972),modafied, 503 F.2d 1305, 1317-19 (5th Cir. 1974);
Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53, 120-21, 126 (E.D. Tex. 1974), rev'd, 535 F.2d 864 (5th
Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 322 (1977), on remand, 562 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1977).
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varying levels of skill, it is often unable to envision a comprehensive
social policy. Furthermore, presentation of evidence, and analysis of re-
medial alternatives may be hamstrung by rules of admissibility of evi-
dence and standing.
The creation, through legislation or judicial rule, of a remedial
agency within the federal judiciary is an attractive alternative to the
current adhoc approach. Establishment of a remedial agency would not
alter the process by which substantive right and liability are deter-
mined. However, the process by which specific remedies are developed
and implemented would take on a form more suited to its substance.
The proposed agency would perform the tasks of a judicial adjunct
whenever so ordered by a judge in a specific case. A party or parties
would be able to appeal a judge's refusal to order use of the remedial
agency, just as parties can presently appeal a refusal to appoint a master
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 53. Specific statutory authority would define the
limits of agency discretion for the specific remedial task undertaken.
Establishment of the proposed agency would allow coordination of
evidence-gathering techniques and sharing of available remedial re-
sources. Appointment of a judicial adjunct, particularly one who will
administer, enforce, or monitor a remedy necessarily implies staff and
resource needs. An agency could perform much of the ministerial
work-evidence-gathering and study of remedial alternatives and policy
considerations. Ideally the individual relationship between adjunct,
judge, and parties would be maintained, but at lower cost, with greater
expertise, and increased effectiveness. The proposed agency could also
serve a comprehensive and acceptable monitoring role. The availability
of such a monitor. would minimize the need for the open-ended intrusion
into a defendant's administration that has been criticized by appellate
courts. The remedial process is essentially an exercise in management
and organization. Admittedly, the litigation that precedes this stage of
management and organization colors its perspective and increases its
complexities. However, improving the management and organization
of the institution or services remains the primary goal of the remedy.
The proposal to create a semi-autonomous remedial agency to per-
form the functions that judicial adjuncts presently perform on an ad hoc
basis formally separates liability determination from remedial planning
and implementation. It places primary responsibility for managing the
remedy in semi-autonomous administrative hands, hence minimizing
the conflict between the judicial model of dispute resolution and the
demands of the remedy. Although responsibility for formal approval
and enforcement of the remedy would remain with the trial court, a
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remedial agency would assume its duties once the substantive liability
decision has been reached. It would incorporate skills and procedures
specifically designed for the remedial process.
The concept of separating liability determination from remedy for-
mulation has solid roots in at least two current practices: the separation
of functions in American administrative procedure8 ° and the bifurcated
post-verdict sentencing procedure of the criminal justice system.8' Both
the administrative model and sentencing procedure separate adjudica-
tive, liability-determining functions from remedial, administrative ones.
The proposed remedial agency need not be entirely autonomous.
Given the complex issues and the overlapping participation of govern-
ment branches at state and federal levels, full separation from the judi-
cial branch would be difficult to achieve. Thus, while many of the
problems faced by adhoc judicial adjuncts could be resolved through the
creation of a remedial agency, a new set of dilemmas might arise.
B. The Remedial Agency. Forms and Functions
The remedial agency proposed above would incorporate the duties
currently performed by judicial adjuncts. As envisioned, it would cen-
tralize and accord consistency to the remedial process; more clearly de-
fine the judicial, quasi-judicial, and other tasks that judicial adjuncts
presently perform; and facilitate closer scrutiny of the remedial process
by trial judges and appellate courts. Particularly with regard to separa-
tion of powers and levels of discretion, the remedial agency would be a
civil law counterpart of the criminal law probation and sentencing
bureaucracy.
As discussed earlier, judicial adjuncts face a number of systemic con-
straints. The mandate and degree of discretion given the adjunct by the
trial judge are often unclear. The network of relationships among ad-
junct, court, and parties in public law disputes is complex. Adjuncts
80. Freedman, supra note 53, at 137-46, 172-73. See also L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION (1965); Stewart, Reformation, supra note 48, at 1698-1702.
81. Separation of sentencing from guilt-determination, for the most part, has come about
informally because of presentence report requirements and similar sentence-preparation pro-
visions, see Coffee, supra note 4, and by the presentence post-verdict motion procedures.
Under the proposed Model Sentencing and Corrections Act a presentence report is required
in all felony cases, and the sentencing hearing is a separate stage of the trial, held following
the verdict. MODEL SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS ACT (U.L.A.), §§ 3-203, 3-206 (Na-
tional Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, L.E.A.A., U.S. Dept. of Justice
1979). Different types of evidence and a separate system of "proof" are required. Evidence at
sentencing is informal and tailored to the needs of a particular case. See Coffee, supra note 4,
at 1370-81, 1399-1404. It should be noted that the informality of the sentencing courts has
been strongly criticized by Coffee and others. This does not lessen the value of permitting
some flexibility and openness in the "sentencing" or remedial process.
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may be asked to perform multiple roles--quasi-adjudicative duties and
negotiating or informational responsibilities need to be separated; a sys-
tem for training and appropriately using existing expertise needs to be
devised. The method of and necessity for appellate review are ill-de-
fined. This final section describes how the proposed remedial agency
might alleviate the problems of the existing ad hoc judicial adjunct sys-
tem and examines the disadvantages and advantages of formalizing the
remedial process.
1. Mandate and Discretion
A remedial agency can streamline the remedial process in complex
cases only if its functions are defined and the limits of its discretion care-
fully drawn. Judicial adjuncts whose activities usurp the policymaking
functions of a defendant agency or institution can be likened to adminis-
trative officials who exceed statutory authority or act arbitrarily. Under
administrative law, disputes over abuse of discretion are resolved ac-
cording to statutory or regulatory provisions governing agency behavior.
Where regulations are unclear, courts have specific procedures to clarify
the standard of discretion. At present, however, no such standard proce-
dure exists to review and limit a judicial adjunct's exercise of discretion-
ary authority pursuant to a court order. Disputes between parties, or
between parties and adjunct, are sometimes negotiated by the adjunct,
sometimes negotiated or adjudicated by the trial court, and sometimes
treated as substantive issues by appellate courts.
8 2
The statute or court rule establishing a remedial agency could set
standards by which to measure and monitor adjunct behavior. The trial
court could then refer the mechanics of the remedy to the agency, while
retaining jurisdiction over disputed substantive issues.
2. Separation of Roles Within the Remedial Agency
The distinct phases of the remedial process--remedy planning, imple-
mentation, administration, and monitoring--should flow consistently
while remaining distinct from one another. This is particularly true
where the agency must be sensitive to the possible need for "recalibra-
tion" or reevaluation of the remedy as conditions change over time.
82. The practice of using judicial adjuncts as informal conflict resolvers has been noted by
commentators. See Special Project supra note 2. In some cases, the trial court has expressly
made this one of the judicial adjunct's functions, for instance, where biracial committees were
created to facilitate party communication. See, e.g., Valley v. Rapides Parish School Bd, 434
F.2d 144, 160 (5th Cir. 1970). In the Pennhurst case, the parties and the Special Master have
also turned repeatedly to the trial court to resolve differences, even while the substantive
issues were being appealed. Bradley, supra note 12.
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Clear delineation of roles may also permit more closely tailored
remedies.
Separation of functions is a critical element of the proposed adminis-
trative adjunct agency. Separation should be achieved by procedures
which closely parallel those in existing administrative agencies, both
civil and criminal.8 3 Different personnel should be responsible for quasi-
adjudicative tasks, negotiating, ministerial roles, and evidence-gather-
ing. Most importantly, to reduce the potential for conflicts that exists
under the present ad hoc system ministerial functions should be separate
from adjudicative functions.
3. Appellate Review and Relationships with the Judic'ag
In the past, as noted earlier, appellate court condemnation of intru-
sive remedies has concentrated on the need to refine the scope or dura-
tion of the remedy, without concommitantly analyzing the remedial
process or the specific role of judicial adjuncts.84 In this sense the actions
of both trial courts and adjuncts appear to be largely discretionary. In
fact, though, appellate courts have kept a tight, if ill-defined, rein on the
actions of judicial adjuncts. In Pennhurst the Supreme Court may have
sounded the death knell for unbridled adjunct activity.
8 5
A specific procedure for review of remedial agency actions is essential
to defining the boundaries of remedial activities. Review procedures
should not diminish or remove trial court discretion to devise creative
and issue-responsive equitable remedies.86  But trial court creativity
83. See supra notes 63, 80, and 81.
84. Bradley v. School Bd, 324 F. Supp. 456, 459 (E.D. Va. 1971); Halderman v.
Pennhurst, 448 U.S. 905 (1980). A continuing difficulty with the appellate court review is the
uncertain finality of the remedial process; an apparently "final" substantive decree may be
followed by numerous remedial decrees. The doctrine of "practical finality" recognized by
the Supreme Court in Gillespie v. United States Steel, 379 U.S. 148 (1964) provides at least
the legal basis for appellate review soon after the substantive decree. As noted earlier, practi-
cal review remains difficult, particularly where no stay or only a partial stay of a remedial
plan is involved. See, e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst, 448 U.S. 905 (1980) (stay of judgment
granted in part, denied in part). The problem of achieving the appropriate balance between
consistency and the need for individual remedial tailoring continues. See Special Project,
supra note 2, at 851-52. A stay was denied in Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ.,
436 F.2d 856 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. den., 409 U.S. 1001 (1972). In the various stages of Morgan
v. Kerrigan, 409 F. Supp. 1141 (D. Mass. 1975), either no stay was sought or no stay was
granted; certiorari was denied in each instance by the Supreme Court.
85. See discussion supra note 52.
86. Much of the procedure would resemble the present system of appeal from decisions of
federal administrative agencies. Appellate courts have a similar relationship with judges (or
sentencing authorities) in criminal proceedings. Except where statutes or rules provide other-
wise, appellate courts review of criminal sentences is limited to matters of discretion and
illegality of sentence; de now review of sentence appropriateness is impermissible. Even where
sentence appeal is permitted, the circumstances are narrowly defined and separate from ap-
peal of substantive issues. Se 18 U.S.C. § 3576 (1976) (added by the Organized Crime Con-
trol Act of 1970 P.L. 91-452). See also United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980).
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should be tempered by clearly articulated views of adjunct discretion
and authority, placing the primary burden for planning and implement-
ing a remedy on the remedial agency. This model parallels the tradi-
tional appellate review model in administrative law, although here trial
courts retain the first-level review (as well as approval and enforcement
powers) of the agency's remedial decision.
The relationship between remedial agency and "regulated" defendant
agency or institution should also be clearly defined. An appeal structure
should be available to check the remedial agency's activities; existing
sanctions for violation of court orders should be retained. Note that
under the remedial agency proposal a defendant agency would no
longer be forced into an adversary relationship with a court-controlled
adjunct while the court is adjudicating the defendant's claims relating
to the remedy.
Changes beyond mere establishment of the agency might be required
to successfully coordinate appellate procedure and remedy implementa-
tion. At present, the remedy, or elements thereof, may be stayed pend-
ing appeal. In most cases, however, the remedy is implemented while
both the substantive issues of the litigation and the nature of the remedy
are appealed.8 7 The practical effect of this is to limit appellate review to
that part of the remedy which is in place when the substantive appeal is
heard. Subsequent phases of a remedy may be appealed separately, but
appellate courts may never have an opportunity to review a remedy in
its entirety. Moreover, because trial courts and adjuncts meanwhile
continue planning, implementing, and even monitoring the original
remedy, almost any modification of a decree on appeal will disrupt an
ongoing process, at the expense of time, money, and effort.
Perhaps if public law remedies were not only administered by a semi-
autonomous agency but were appealable in separate, parallel proceed-
ings, some of these problems of coordination could be avoided. An al-
ternative solution might be for appellate courts to set down specific
procedural guidelines for remedy implementation pending review.
4. Tasks and Skills
Once the tasks to be performed by the remedial agency are defined, it
becomes essential to articulate the skills and expertise needed to carry
out those functions.
87. This occurred in Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), where the trial court negoti-
ated with the parties to devise a civilian-police review board mechanism. Shortly after a
settlement was agreed upon by all parties, the Supreme Court reversed the entire case on the
underlying substantive issue. The court and parties in Haderman v. Pennhurst experienced
similar frustration when parties were negotiating with one another while they were adversa-
ries in court.
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The tasks of the proposed remedial agency should mirror those pres-
ently undertaken by court-appointed adjuncts or experts: formulation,
implementation, administration, and monitoring of a remedy tailored to
the needs of a specific case.
Thus, the remedial agency should be structured to provide not only
the technical skill necessary to develop appropriate remedies, but also
the policy skills necessary to effectuate those remedies and the expertise
necessary to monitor the remedy with sufficient detachment. Ideally,
those who are planners will draw upon the available range of social,
legislative, and behavioral information, without the restrictions of the
adjudicatory structure. They should be able to assess alternative meth-
ods of implementing a court's order. The requisite policy decisions
should not be made by adversary players, but by people with the appro-
priate skills to make such judgments.
5. Disadvantages
There are some drawbacks to institutionalizing a remedial agency,
even if, as proposed, it remains part of the judicial branch. A single
agency which performs functions ranging from remedy planning to
monitoring may be open to conflicts of interest similar to those which
affect ad hoc adjuncts. Also, while there is benefit to be gained from
consistency among remedies in similar cases, institutionalization may
pose a danger of rigid standardization. Removal of the conflict resolu-
tion process from the community in which the dispute was generated
may slow down the remedial process. Unless special care is taken, the
removal may decrease both the effectiveness and the legitimacy of a
remedy.
A.persistent concern is that of "bureaucratization" of the judiciary
and creation of self-perpetuating bureaucracies.8 8 Organization theory
teaches that institutions quickly take on the goal of self-perpetuation as
they become larger. An adjunct becomes an institution when the tasks
to be performed require expertise and services that are beyond the man-
agement capacity of one individual.89 An adjunct agency that occupies
even a temporary line in a state or city's budget, as many court-ap-
pointed adjuncts do, may come to reflect the policies of the bureaucracy
that it was established to overseeY0
In NAACP v. Brennan, described earlier, the adjunct bureaucracy be-
88. See, e.g., Chayes-2, supra note 1. Fiss, Forward, supra note 1.
89. Set Note, Judicial Intervention and Organiwaion Theo" Changing Bureaucratic Behavior and
Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 513 (1980).
90. The funds required to support an adjunct bureaucracy can be monumental. The
Office of the Special Master appointed in Haldeiman v. Pennhurst received over $850,000 annu-
ally (during 1978-1980) for 16 professionals, 5 support staff, and 7 parent liaisons. See Brad-
ley, supra note 12, at 133.
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came a "shadow agency" that mirrored many of the functions of the
U.S. Department of Labor.9' In Willowbrook, a review panel of experts
established to monitor implementation of the consent decree, came
under attack in part because of its drain on state resources.92 The Office
of the Special Master in Pennhurst, which was criticized for similar rea-
sons, had many of the characteristics of the institutional adjunct. Its
scope was broad-to formulate as well as to implement and monitor a
remedy. 93 The Special Master was eased "out of business" by the court
during the last half of 1982.
Danger inheres in the continued successful functioning of an adjunct
bureaucracy when success is measured by the promised vindication of
the rights secured by the decree instead of by specified structural
changes in the system. "[T]he more successful [the adjunct] is in carry-
ing out the complex tasks set out in the order, the more it is likely to
relieve the defendants of their statutory responsibilities for system plan-
ning and development."9 Moreover, it is difficult for the adjunct to
simply pack up and move away when implementation is complete. Per-
manent changes must be made in the defendant agency if the remedy is
truly to succeed.
Finally, a remedial agency may find it difficult to terminate its re-
sponsibilities. At present, termination of court involvement usually
comes about by judicial order, although a court may retain jurisdiction
for a time to see a remedy put in place. If responsibility for planning
and implementing a remedy shifts to a remedial agency, the point of
termination is less clear. A clear termination mechanism is essential to
avoid the hazard of ceaseless intervention. There must be a point at
which the defendant agency is deemed capable of managing alone.
91. The case involved a suit by farmworker groups against the Department of Labor for
failing to enforce federal statutes requiring state employment offices to provide job training
and other employment services for minorities. NAACP v. Brennan, 360 F. Supp. 1006
(D.D.C. 1973), supplemented by 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 9634 (D.D.C. 1974). See, e.g.,
Altman, Implemenhng a Civil Rights Injimnion." A Case Study of NAACP v. Brennan, 78 COLUM. L.
REV. 739 (1978).
92. N.Y. State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 492 F. Supp. 1099 (E.D.N.Y.
1980); 492 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D.N.Y.), revd, 631 F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 1980). When the New York
State Legislature refused to fund the review panel for fiscal year 1980-1981, citing other pri-
orities and questioning the authority of a federal court to mandate a permanent state bureau-
cracy that duplicated the existing state welfare department, the dispute was thrust back into
the federal courts. District Judge Bartels ordered Governor Carey to submit a supplemental
budget request to the legislature to fund the panel operation. N.Y. State Ass'n for Retarded
Children, Inc. v. Carey, 492 F. Supp. 1110, 1115 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). The Governor and Comp-
troller appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed. 631 F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 1980). The district
court was thus faced with three choices: finance the Review Panel in some other way, appeal
to the Supreme Court, or reframe the mandamus action in such a way that the Court of Ap-
peals would approve it.
93. 612 F.2d 84, 111 (3d Cir. 1979),revd', 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
94. Bradley, supra note 12, at 68.
393
Yale Law & Policy Review
The point of termination could be determined in one of three ways.
First, courts could retain jurisdiction until some appropriate point of
"completion" and then issue a final order. Second, specific time limits
could be imposed in advance. The initial order of reference from the
court could set a time limit for remedial agency involvement which the
court could extend if necessary. Alternatively, the legislation or regula-
tions creating the remedial agency could specify a precise term of inter-
vention (six months, for instance) renewable at designated periods.
Finally, the task of terminating remedial agency involvement could be
left to the discretion of the remedial agency. In this case, a party should
have the option to appeal to the court if it feels that the adjunct has
abused its discretion.
Summaty and Conclusion
The judicial adjunct can potentially provide tremendous assistance to
courts struggling with the complex remedies of public law litigation.
Under the present ad hoc approach to appointment, training, and super-
vision, however, this potential is not fully realized. An adjunct agency
could reduce the problems of ill-defined or conflicting roles, allow fuller
development of adjunct expertise, and permit independent evaluation
and monitoring of court orders, while still permitting adjunct appoint-
ments to be tailored to the specific needs of particular lawsuits. In so
doing, it would help assure that the courts' intent in public lawsuits will
become reality, and that those who win in the courts will truly prevail.
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